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The current study investigated the subjective states of recollection and familiarity 
in source memory. Participants studied low and high frequency words, presented in one 
of two sources, and were then asked to make source decisions and subjective judgments 
of recollection and familiarity at test. Half of participants were asked to identify the 
source of an item before the subjective awareness judgment (SM-first group), while the 
other half of participants made a source decision to an item after judging it as recollected 
or familiar (RF-first group). The test order manipulation affected participants’ patterns of 
responding. Participants in the RF-first group tended to give a recollect response to old 
items more often. Participants in the SM-first group demonstrated better source memory. 
Source memory was better for recollect judgments than familiar judgments; however, 
source memory was above chance for familiar judgments. The low frequency word 
advantage was found for recognition, source memory, and in judgments of subjective 
awareness. A review of the related literature and current theories concerning human 










Tulving (1983) introduced the classification of memory as being either episodic 
or semantic, referring to whether details of an event are consciously recollected or not at 
the time of retrieval, and further made the distinction between autonoetic and noetic 
consciousness to reflect different states of conscious awareness that account for one’s 
personal past and relates to these two types of memory classes (Tulving, 1985). 
Autonoetic consciousness is thought to correspond to episodic memory, where details of 
a personal memory can be consciously retrieved, such as remembering the last movie one 
saw. Noetic consciousness is thought to correspond to semantic memory, or general 
knowledge about the world that is not associated with specific details of encountering an 
event’s initial occurrence, such as having knowledge of one’s own name. Delineating 
these two memory systems and their conscious correlates has given rise to a body of 
research investigating factors that may differentially affect one type of memory from 
another (e. g., Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Donaldson, 1996; Yonelinas, 
2002). 
The remember/know procedure was developed by Tulving (1985) intended to 
separate remembering due to recollection of episodic details and remembering due to 
feelings of familiarity. This procedure queries participants’ subjective state of awareness 
during a memory test. Typically, on a recognition memory test, participants are shown a 
list of items that have been previously studied along with new items that serve as 
distracters or foils. Participants must not only determine whether an item is old or new, 
but also must decide whether specific details of the item’s occurrence that were encoded 
at the time of study are accessible or not for an item called old at retrieval. Participants 
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are told to assign a remember designation to an item if specific details from the time of 
study are present. If an item called old lacks any specific episodic details of its initial 
occurrence, participants are told to make a know designation to refer to the general 
feeling of familiarity present for that item.  
This subjective measure of awareness has yielded mixed results when used in past 
investigations of recognition memory. The frequency of remember and know responses to 
recognized items has been shown to vary across a range of manipulations applied at the 
time of encoding and retrieval. Deeper levels of processing (e.g., generating a word from 
an anagram) at encoding has been shown to produce more remember responses at test 
compared to remember responses given to items that were encoded under shallow 
conditions (e.g., generating an unrelated rhyming word) while often leaving know 
responses equal and unchanged (Gardiner, 1988; Rajaram, 1993; Bodner & Lindsay, 
2003). Words have also been shown to receive more remember responses at retrieval 
compared to nonwords, however nonwords showed higher rates of know responses 
(Gardiner & Java, 1990). This pattern followed with items encoded as either a picture or 
word, with pictures receiving more remember responses while words received more know 
responses (Rajaram, 1993). Divided attention at study has also been shown to 
differentially affect patterns of remember and know responding, with divided attention 
conditions yielding fewer remember responses as difficulty on the divided attention task 
increases, while leaving know responses unchanged (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990).  
The remember/know procedure has also had to account for the word frequency 
effect (Glanzer & Adams, 1985; 1990; Glanzer, Hilford, & Kim, 2004). The word 
frequency effect is the finding that words of low frequency are consistently more 
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accurately recognized, in terms of greater hits and fewer false alarms to items at test, than 
high frequency words. An advantage for low frequency words has been found 
consistently in recognition memory and in recognition accompanied with a remember 
response (Gardiner & Java, 1990; Strack & Förster, 1995; Gardiner, Richardson-Klavenh, 
Ramponi, 1997; Guttentag & Carroll, 1997; Reder et al., 2000; Diana & Reder, 2006). 
Interestingly, correctly recognized words of low frequency have been shown to elicit 
equal rates of know responses compared to high frequency words and, in some cases, 
high frequency words have been shown to elicit even greater rates of know responses 
compared to low frequency words (e. g., Strack & Förster, 1995; Guttentag & Carroll, 
1997; Diana & Reder, 2006). This consistent word frequency effect found in recognition 
memory may be able to account for some of the disparate findings in the way questions 
regarding one aspect of a remembered event or another are asked at the time of test. 
Specifically, how this effect may interact with the patterns of responding shown in 
remember/know judgments. 
Thus, prior research suggests that certain manipulations can give rise to different 
patterns in remember/know responding, and that this subjective measure of awareness can 
vary in many ways. The remember/know procedure may not necessarily tap the processes 
present at retrieval assumed to contributed to conscious recollection of a remembered 
event or remembering based on general feeling of familiarity (cf. Rotello, Macmillan, 
Reeder, & Wong, 2005). Nevertheless, this procedure is useful in that responses fluctuate 
and interact with different manipulations that also affect overall recognition memory, and 
this subjective measure is useful in contributing to theories concerning the nature of 
human memory (see Yonelinas, 2002 for a review). 
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The source monitoring theory (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) has been 
used as a paradigm to measure details retrieved from an item or event’s original 
occurrence. In a typical source monitoring paradigm, participants study items from two or 
more sources (e.g., seeing an item vs. hearing an item) and, at test, are asked to decide 
whether an item is old or new as well as distinguish from what source the item was 
originally presented (e.g., seen vs. heard). Memories for the source of an item may 
consist of spatiotemporal details (e.g., size or location), perceptual details (e.g., font or 
color), and different cognitive operations (e.g., imagine or rate), to name just a few. Some 
have argued that accurate source discrimination is accompanied by the conscious 
recollection of the details of an item’s original occurrence, as might be the case for 
remember responses, and that accurate source recognition may not be able to occur if a 
test item lacks any associative details at retrieval, as might be the case for know responses 
(Donaldson, MacKenzie, & Underhill, 1996; Perfect, Mayes, Downes, & Van Eijk, 1996; 
Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006). It is also important to note that 
a low frequency word advantage has also been found in source memory (Guttentag & 
Carroll, 1997; Glanzer et al., 2004; Diana & Reder, 2006). 
Indeed, remember responses have been shown to reflect similar patterns of 
recognition when tested separately from source memory, either as a between-subjects 
manipulation or in separate experiments (Donaldson et al., 1996; Mather, Henkel, & 
Johnson, 1997; Diana & Reder, 2006), and this pattern has been shown consistently even 
when the remember/know and source decisions are made for each recognized item. 
Interestingly, a consistent pattern is not found in know responses when investigated along 
with source memory, and the prior research suggests that factors operating at retrieval 
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may clarify the relationship between source memory and recognition associated with a 
remember/know responses.  
A list of studies using the remember/know procedure and the source monitoring 
paradigm in combination at test is shown in Table 1. For the given studies, the findings 
are variable, and the methodologies regarding testing to measure source memory and 
subjective states of awareness are not consistent, but these studies provide insight into the 
patterns of responding given testing conditions present at retrieval. Some of the 
investigations show source memory at chance levels for know responses (Perfect et al., 
1996; Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006), suggesting no contextual 
details being retrieved for those items. Other studies have shown source memory being 
above chance levels for this subjective measure of familiarity (Conway & Dewhurst, 
1995; Hicks, Marsh, & Ritschel, 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Starns & Hicks, 2005; 
Meiser & Sattler, 2007), suggesting that some contextual details may be present for those 
items at retrieval, but maybe not enough to decide that those items can be given a 
response reflecting the retrieval of episodic details. Although the studies listed in Table 1 
vary in the types of sources used (e.g., perceptual or semantic), in the factors present at 
encoding (e.g., long or short encoding time), and in factors during retention (e.g., 1 hour 
or 1 week retention interval), the important point of these studies for present purposes is 
to focus on the factors at retrieval. More specifically, how are the remember/know and 
source questions asked?  
Of the studies presented in Table 1, the investigations that show source memory at 
chance given a know response, the remember/know questions was always asked before 




Review of Studies of Source Memory and Remember-Know Judgments. 
 
Study     Test Order            Source Memory for Ks 
 
 
Conway & Dewhurst (1995)  O/N – R/K (test 1)   above chance 
 Exp. 2    SM – R/K (test 2) 
 
 
Perfect et al. (1996)   R/K/N (test 1)     at chance 
 Exp. 1-5   SM (test 2)             (except for Exp. 3) 
 
 
Dewhurst & Hitch (1999)  R/K – SM    at chance 
 Exp. 2    (SM only if confident) 
 
 
Hicks et al. (2002)   SM – R/K    above chance 
 Exp. 1 & 2 
 
 
Meiser & Bröder (2002)  O/N – R/K – SM   above chance 
 Exp. 2 
 
 
Starns & Hicks (2005)  R/K – SM     above chance 
 Exp. 1 & 2 
 
 
Dudukovic & Knowlton (2006) O/N – R/K – SM1 – SM2  at chance 
 Exp. 1 
 
 
Meiser & Sattler (2007)  O/N – R/K – SM    above chance 
 Exp. 1-3 
 
 
given a know response, all but two asked the remember/know judgment after the source 
question. It could stand to reason that asking one type of question before the other may 
affect judgments concerning the types of details being retrieved. Several studies have 
manipulated the order of questions or type of questions asked at test, and have shown to 
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affect patterns of responding in investigations of the remember/know procedure (Hicks & 
Marsh, 1999; Eldridge, Sarfatti, & Knowlton, 2002) and in source monitoring (Dodson & 
Johnson, 1993; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). However no direct manipulation of test order has 
been used when investigating remember/know responses and source memory in the same 
study. Details of subjective awareness that are claimed to be present at retrieval may 
reflect details of an item’s source or other details not inherently associated with the item’s 
perceptual features. This may be why source memory is not perfectly correlated with this 
subjective measure of recollection and why feelings of familiarity may contain enough 
details in memory, whether conscious or not, to correctly identify the source of a 
recognized item (i.e., know responses being above chance for accurate source memory). 
These details may be affected by asking what to consider first; memory for the source of 
an item, or if any episodic details are present or not for an item judged to be old.  
Although a manipulation of test order has not been used in a combined source 
memory and remember/know design, past studies from both lines of research have shown 
how questions are asked at test can affect patterns of responses. Hicks and Marsh (1999), 
and Eldridge et al. (2002), investigated recollection and familiarity and gave participants 
either two questions at test, an old/new question followed by a remember/know judgment 
for items judged old, or one question at test, a remember/know/new judgment. 
Participants who were given the one question at test tended to produce higher hits and 
false alarms for items judged remembered and higher false alarms for items called know 
(no differences in know hits), suggesting participants who were given the one question at 
test responded more liberally than participants who were given two questions. Dodson 
and Johnson (1993) manipulated the testing situation in a source memory test by asking 
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participants for either a binary source judgment or a four alternative forced-choice source 
judgment. Participants who received the four alternative judgment were less likely to 
make incorrect source judgments than participants who were given the binary judgment. 
Marsh and Hicks (1998) also manipulated the type of questions asked in a source 
memory test by asking participants if they remembered specific details of the item for the 
source decision (i.e., Did you hear this item at study? or Did you see this item at study?). 
Participants who were queried about the specific details of an item at test were better able 
to recognize the source of the item if it came from that particular source as oppose to the 
other source. These results suggest that having to judge features of an item at test (i.e., 
old/new or which did you see?) as oppose to the subjective details of an item or an open-
ended source decision (i.e., remember/know/new or seen/heard?) may cause participants 
to focus more on those details of an item that would lead to more accurate remembering, 
as opposed to more spurious recognition shown in increases in false alarms for remember 
and know judgments and incorrect source memory. 
The present experiment investigates source memory and the subjective state of 
awareness of an item’s occurrence at study by manipulating the order in which the 
questions are asked at test and observing the patterns of responses given to low frequency 
and high frequency words. Participants will study low and high frequency words 
presented either on the left or right side of a computer monitor in a corresponding 
background color. For half of participants, a source memory question will be asked 
before a question concerning their subjective awareness of recollection or familiarity for 
each item at test. For the other half of participants, these questions will be reversed, with 
the subjective awareness question preceding the source question. In order to avoid any 
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ambiguity in the interpretation of the recollection and familiarity distinction, the measure 
of subjective awareness asks participants to give a recollect response to items they feel 
give rise to the retrieval of contextual or episodic details (i.e., a remember response) and 
to give a familiar response to items they feel lack any episodic details from study (i.e., a 
know response). The questions of interest for the current investigation are: does 
manipulating the order of the type of question at test affect participants’ recognition 
accuracy, source accuracy, and judgments of subjective awareness, and is any difference 
reflected in terms of items’ normative word frequency? The results will be discussed as 



















 One hundred fifty-two Louisiana State University undergraduate students 
participated for an introductory course requirement or in exchange for extra credit 
towards a psychology course. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the RF-
first test order group and the other half were assigned to the SM-first test order group. 
Each participant was tested individually in sessions that lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
Design and Materials 
 One hundred twenty words of high and low frequency were selected as stimuli 
from the Kučera and Francis (1967) compendium. Low frequency words had an average 
rate of occurrence of 6 per million. High frequency words had an average rate of 
occurrence of 63 per million. Word frequency was manipulated within-subjects. 
Participants were presented with 30 high and 30 low frequency words at study. Words 
were presented in all uppercase letters, either on the left side of the computer monitor in a 
red background or on the right side of the computer monitor in a green background. A set 
of arithmetic problems served as a four minute filler task between study and test. At test, 
all studied words were presented along with 60 lure words, 30 of high and 30 of low 
frequency. The order of test instructions was manipulated between-subjects and described 
in more detail in the procedure. All words were counterbalanced for the study and test 
portions of the experiment.  
Procedure 
 At the beginning of the experimental session, participants were instructed to 
remember words for a later memory test. Participants then proceeded to the study phase 
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of the experiment. Words were presented for 3 seconds each with an interstimulus 
interval of 150 ms. At completion of study, participants were given the filler task. 
Participants were told that their problem solving abilities were to be assessed, and were 
given a set of twelve multiplication problems to be solved for four minutes. After the 
filler task, participants were given instructions for the test.  
 Participants were given recollect-familiar instructions as well as instructions to 
identify an item’s source at test. Recollect-familiar instructions were given as follows: 
For this part of the experiment, if you believe that a word was presented 
earlier, you will be asked to choose the reason that you believe a test word 
was presented. There are many possibilities for this decision. One option 
is that you believe the word was presented because it feels very familiar to 
you. This would be similar to the feeling that people have sometimes 
when they pass someone on the street and know that we've met the person 
before, but cannot think of when or where. There are other possibilities 
that all include cases in which you feel like you can mentally travel back 
in time to the specific moment you encountered the word. This feeling is 
called recollection. For example, you might recognize a test word because 
you remember forming an image of the word. Or perhaps you recall 
something you thought of when you encountered the word. Or perhaps 
you recall one or two words that were presented just before or after the test 
word. Or that you recall specifically which side of the screen the item was 
shown on. Or even that you recall something that happened in or near the 
room when the word was presented (such as a noise outside the door). But 
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you should respond with one of these types of options ONLY if the test 
word brings back to mind a vivid recollection of one of these particular 
details. To summarize, you'll be making decisions about whether you 
remember that a test word was presented to you earlier or not presented at 
all. If you believe that the test word was presented earlier, you'll be asked 
to decide whether this word simply feels familiar to you or whether you 
recollect specific details. If it simply feels familiar, then press the 'FAM' 
key on the keyboard. If you can recollect any type of specific detail, then 
press the 'REC' key.  
Participants were instructed to press one of two keys on the keyboard to make the 
recollect-familiar judgment. Instructions to identify an item’s source prompted 
participants to press one of two keys on the keyboard to judge whether an item appeared 
on the left side of the computer monitor in a red background or on the right side of the 
computer monitor in a green background. For all participants, the first set of options at 
test was accompanied with the option to call an item “new.” Participants were 
admonished from guessing, and told to make a “new” response if they felt they had to 
guess. All of the test instructions were shown on the computer monitor and verbally 
reiterated by the experimenter. All 120 words were presented one at a time in the center 
of the screen with the source options and recollect-familiar options appearing below the 
item. Half of the participants were prompted to make a recollect-familiar-new judgment 
first, then a source judgment for items labeled recollect or familiar (RF-first group). The 
other half of the participants were prompted to make a left/red-right/green-new source 
judgment first, then a recollect-familiar judgment for items given one of the two source 
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claims (SM-first group). Participants were debriefed as to their involvement upon 


























 Overall recognition memory performance is shown in Table 2. Recognition 
memory was measured using a corrected recognition measure (hits – false alarms). A 2 
(test order: SM-first vs. RF-first) × 2 (word frequency: low vs. high) mixed factorial 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with test order as the between-subjects 
factor and word frequency as the within-subjects factor. The analysis revealed a main 
effect of word frequency, F (1, 150) = 152.30, MSE = 1.67, p < .01, η  = .50. Low 
frequency words (M = .57) were better recognized than high frequency words (M = .42), 
replicating the word frequency mirror effect. There was no main effect of test order, F (1, 
150) = .349, MSE = .016, p > .05, η  = .02. Participants in the SM-first group (M = .49) 
showed equal recognition performance as those in the RF-first group (M = .50). No 








 Recognition memory performance for the test order groups and for word 
frequency given either a recollect or familiar response is shown in Table 2. A 2 (test 
order: SM-first vs. RF-first) × 2 (word frequency: low vs. high) mixed factorial ANOVA 
was conducted on the mean hit rates, false alarm rates, and corrected recognition rates of 
recollect and familiar responses with test order as the between-subjects factor and word 
frequency as the within-subjects factor. The rate of recollect responses for corrected 
recognition was significantly higher for low frequency words (M = .38) than high 
frequency words (M = .27), F (1, 150) = 100.91, MSE = .825, p < .01, η  = .402. The rate 2p
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of recollect responses for corrected recognition for the RF-first group (M = .36) was 
significantly higher compared to the SM-first group (M = .29), F (1, 150) = 4.70, MSE = 
Table 2 
Hit Rates, False Alarm Rates, and Corrected Recognition Rates as a Function of Test Order, 
Word Frequency, and Response Type. 
 
Test  Response    Word Frequency 
Order  Type   Low      High 
 
    Hits      FAs     Corrected  Hits      FAs     Corrected 
SM-first       Overall         .67 (.02)    .11 (.01)     .56 (.02)         .62 (.02)      .21 (.02)    .42 (.02)
         Recollect        .38 (.02)     .03 (.01)     .35 (.02)         .30 (.02)      .07 (.01)    .24 (.02)
          Familiar         .29 (.02)     .08 (.01)     .21 (.02)         .32 (.02)      .14 (.01)    .18 (.02)
RF-first        Overall         .70 (.02)     .12 (.01)     .58 (.02)         .65 (.02)     .23 (.02)    .42 (.02)
         Recollect        .44 (.03)     .04 (.01)     .40 (.03)         .37 (.02)      .06 (.01)    .31 (.02)
          Familiar         .25 (.02)     .08 (.01)     .17 (.02)         .28 (.02)      .17 (.01)    .11 (.02)
Note. Standard error of mean in parentheses.  
.318, p < .05, η  = .03. The same pattern followed for the hit rates of recollect responses. 
Low frequency words had a greater hit rate (M = .41) than high frequency words (M = 
.34), F (1, 150) = 56.46, MSE = .44, p < .01, η  = .273, and the RF-first group gave 
recollect responses to old items more often (M = .40) than the SM-first group (M = .34), 
although this difference was marginal, F (1, 150) = 3.80, MSE = .305, p = .053, η  = 
.025. Recollect responses to lures were significantly higher for high frequency words (M 









.01, η  = .191. There was also a marginal interaction of test order by word frequency 
with high frequency lures being given recollect responses slightly more often in the SM-
first group (M = .07) than high frequency lures in the RF-first group (M = .06), and low 
frequency lures in the SM-first group (M = .03) and RF-first group (M = .04), F (1, 150) 
= 3.12, MSE = .005, p = .079, η  = .02. There were no other differences found in 





 For items given a familiar response, there was a main effect of word frequency 
for corrected recognition rates. Low frequency words (M = .19) were given more familiar 
responses than high frequency words (M = .14), F (1, 150) = 17.51, MSE = .148, p < .01, 
η  = .105. There was also a main effect of test order with participants in the SM-first 
group giving more familiar responses (M = .19) than those in the RF-first group (M = 
.14),  F (1, 150) = 4.99, MSE = .192, p < .05, η  = .032. For overall hit rates, the pattern 
slightly changed. A main effect was again found for word frequency, but was in the other 
direction for hit rates. High frequency old items were given more familiar responses (M = 
.30) than low frequency old items (M = .27), F (1, 150) = 7.30, MSE = .056, p < .01, η  = 
.046. For familiar responses given to lures, a main effect of word frequency and a test 
order by word frequency interaction was found. Familiar responses given to high 
frequency new items was greater (M = .16) than those given to low frequency new items 
(M = .08), F (1, 150) = 95.72, MSE = .386, p < .01, η = .39, and this occurred more for 
participants in the RF-first group (M = .17) than in the SM-first group (M = .14), while 
low frequency new items were given familiar responses equally often for the RF-first 











η  = .03. No other differences were found for familiar responses, all F’s (1, 150) < 1.78, 




 Source memory was measured using an average conditional source identification 
measure (ACSIM; Murnane & Bayen, 1996), calculated as the proportion of correct 
source identifications among all old items that were called old. Source memory is shown 
in Table 3. ACSIM scores were submitted to a 2 (test order: SM-first vs. RF-first) × 2 
(word frequency: low vs. high) mixed factorial ANOVA with test order as the between-
subjects factor and word frequency as the within-subjects factor. A main effect of word 
frequency was found, F (1, 150) = 61.04, MSE = .62, p < .01, η  = .289. Source memory 
for low frequency words (M = .72) was better than source memory for high frequency 
words (M = .63). Participants in the SM-first group showed similar source memory (M = 
.69) as those in the RF-first group (M = .66), F (1, 150) = 1.84, MSE = .044, p > .05, η  = 
.012, and no interaction was found, F (1, 150) = 1.51, MSE = .015, p > .05, η  = .01. 
 Source memory was also examined as accurate source identifications given either 
a recollect or familiar response. In other words, these measures were analogous to 
ACSIMs, but were contingent on whether participants gave a recollect or familiar 
response. These data are also shown in Table 3. The data were submitted to a 2 (test 
order: SM-first vs. RF-first) × 2 (word frequency: low vs. high) × 2 (response type: 
recollect vs. familiar) mixed factorial ANOVA with test order as the between-subjects 










Average Conditional Source Identification Measures (ACSIMs) as a Function of Test Order, 
Word Frequency, and Response Type (with measure conditionalized on type of response). 
 
Test  Response             Word Frequency 
Order  Type    Low     High 
 
SM-first        Overall   .74 (.01)    .63 (.01) 
          Recollect           .81 (.02)    .74 (.02) 
           Familiar          .65 (.02)    .58 (.02) 
RF-first         Overall   .70 (.02)    .62 (.02) 
          Recollect           .76 (.02)    .65 (.02) 
           Familiar          .60 (.03)    .59 (.03) 
Note. Standard error of mean in parentheses. 
 were found for test order, F (1, 143) = 7.10, MSE = .379, p < .01, η  = .047, word 
frequency, F (1, 143) = 20.83, MSE = .671, p < .01, η  = .127, and response type, F (1, 
143) = 53.00, MSE = 2.64, p < .01, η  = .27. Participants in the SM-first group (M = .70) 
showed better source identification than the RF-first group (M = .64). Low frequency 
words (M = .70) were more correctly identified than high frequency words (M = .64). 
Source identifications associated with recollect responses (M = .74) was better than those 
associated with familiar responses (M = .60). Also of note is that the high frequency 
ACSIM given a familiar response was above chance (M = .58) and this was confirmed by 
comparing the mean value to the chance value of .50 through a one sample t-test, t (148) 









.63) were also significantly above chance, t (147) = 7.24, p < .01. There was a non-
significant word frequency by response type interaction with more recollect responses 
given to low frequency words (M = .78) than recollect responses given to high frequency 
words (M = .69), than familiar responses given to low frequency (M = .63) and high 
frequency words (M = .58), F (1, 143) = 2.79, MSE = .094, p = .097, η  = .019. No other 























The current results replicate previous collective findings from past investigations 
of subjective awareness, source memory, and the word frequency effect. Overall, 
recognition that was accompanied with a recollect response was more accurate than 
recognition accompanied with a familiar response (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java, 
1990). In addition, recollection-based recognition was better for those in the RF-first 
group as compared to the SM-first group. This pattern is evident in the corrected 
recognition rates in Table 2.  The reverse pattern was found in regards to source accuracy 
(Table 3) with the SM-first group showing better source memory following recollect 
responses as compared to the RF-first group (Perfect et al., 1996; Dewhurst & Hitch, 
1999; Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006; Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Hicks et al., 2002; 
Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Starns & Hicks, 2005; Meiser & Sattler, 2007). The SM-first 
group showed higher rates of familiar responses in both the corrected recognition rates as 
well as in the source accuracy data; however, for source accuracy, this trend was only 
found for low frequency words, whereas high frequency words produced equal levels of 
source recognition for familiar responses. Source memory associated with familiar 
responses was shown to be above chance, suggesting that source memory is present at 
retrieval for items that were judged previously to have no associated episodic details 
(Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Hicks et al., 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Starns & Hicks, 
2005; Meiser & Sattler, 2007). 
The findings also replicate the word frequency effect with low frequency words 
being recognized overall more accurately than high frequency words (Glanzer & Adams, 
1985; 1990). Moreover, for hit rates and corrected recognition rates (see Table 2), low 
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frequency words received more recollect responses than high frequency words. This 
pattern tended to occur more for participants in the RF-first group, but this was only 
evident in the hit rates for that group. High frequency words tended to produce more 
familiar responses, but this was only found in the hit rates and false alarm rates. The 
corrected recognition rates for familiar responses were higher for low frequency words 
than high frequency words. The hit rate and corrected recognition rates overall were 
greater for familiar responses in the SM-first group than in the RF-first group. High 
frequency words produced more false alarms overall than low frequency words, and there 
were more false alarms for familiar responses than for recollect responses (see 
Donaldson, 1996; Reder et al., 2000; Diana & Reder, 2006).  The RF-first group showed 
higher rates of familiar false alarms than the SM-first group.  
There was also a word frequency effect for source accuracy data (see Table 3). 
Overall, low frequency words produced better source accuracy than high frequency 
words, replicating the word frequency mirror effect (Glanzer et al., 2004; Diana & Reder, 
2006). This was found in both the recollect responses and familiar responses. Again, the 
SM-first group showed better source accuracy in recollect and familiar responses for low 
and high frequency words than the RF-first group. The important points are the fact that 
familiar responses to high frequency words showed above chance source memory and 
that false alarms were found for recollect responses for both low and high frequency 
words, with high frequency words showing greater false alarm rates for recollect 
responses (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Hicks et al., 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Starns 
& Hicks, 2005; Meiser & Sattler, 2007).  
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The patterns found in the current data can be explained in terms of current 
theories of recognition memory. There are currently two predominant classes of models 
that have been used to accommodate past findings: single process theories and dual 
process theories. The single process theories posit that remembering is due to a single 
process of familiarity in memory.  This process can be modeled in terms of signal 
detection theory (Macmaillan & Creelman, 2005), where two Gaussian distributions, one 
for new items and one for old items, are situated along an axis representing strength of 
memory. A decision criterion is then placed along the axis that accounts for the decision 
to call items old or new.  Figure 1 depicts two such pairs of distributions, one pair for 










Figure 1. Signal detection model for recognition and recollect/familiar distinction. The 
distributions represent the memorial evidence for old and new words of low and high 




Single process models of recollect/familiar responses involve two criteria that are 
placed along the decision axis (Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997; Hirshman & 
Henzler, 1998).  Items that fall to the right of the old-new decision criterion, but to the 
left of the recollect/familiar criterion, will be labeled familiar. If enough episodic detail 
of the item is present and the amount of evidence falls to the right of the recollect/familiar 
criterion, the result is the self-report of an item’s consciously recollected experience (i.e., 
a recollect response). This would explain the higher hit rates and lower false alarm rates 
that are associated with recollection responses over familiar responses in the current data. 
This model would also explain why false alarms can occur for items given a recollect 
response, where no such episodic details should be retrieved from memory for a new 
item, and potentially why items given a familiar response can be associated with accurate 
source memory. The single process interpretation has been shown to account for results 
investigating recollect/familiar responses, source memory, and the word frequency effect 
(Donaldson, 1996; Donaldson et al., 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997; Hirshman & 
Henzler, 1998; Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Dobbins & Kroll, 2005; Slotnick & Dodson, 
2005).  
Signal detection models of source memory account for source recognition by 
having two or more distributions, depending on the number of sources used, that 
represent the memory present for each source, after an item has been recognized as old 
(Slotnick & Dodson, 2005). These distributions are situated along a decision axis with 
criteria placed for each respective source decision. Given the amount of difference or 
similarity between sources, these distributions will move either closer together or farther 
away from each other, thus increasing or decreasing the discriminability between the 
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sources. Given that the sources for the current study are relatively similar in 
memorability, these distributions should only change in terms of the strength associated 
with an item at test. This strength in the current data can be explained in terms of an 
item’s normative word frequency (Glanzer, Adams, Iverson, & Kim, 1993; Wixted & 
Stretch, 2004). 
Single process models can explain the word frequency effect in terms of two 
different distributions for old items that are situated along the decision axis; a distribution 
representing strong items (i.e., low frequency words) that is placed farther away from the 
distribution representing new items, and a distribution representing weak items (i.e., high 
frequency words) that is placed closer to the distribution of new items relative to the 
strong distribution (Glanzer et al., 1993; Wixted & Stretch, 2004). A conceptual model is 
presented in Figure 2. This can account for the advantage low frequency words have over 
high frequency words in recognition accuracy, which is replicated in the current findings. 
When applying the two criteria that are thought to account for recollect and familiar 
responses, as discussed above, this would also explain the advantage that low frequency 
words have over high frequency words in terms of greater hits and fewer false alarms for 
recollect and familiar responses, as well as in the low frequency word advantage found in 
the source accuracy data (Glanzer et al., 2004). The source memory evidence axis is 
orthogonal to the recognition memory axis. By examining Figure 2, one can see how 
source memory, on average, will be better for low frequency words, but also why source 
memory following recollect responses will be even higher as compared to source 
memory following familiar responses. Because recognition memory is generally 
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correlated with source memory (Glanzer et al., 2004), low frequency words have an 














Figure 2. A model for recognition, source memory, and recollect/familiar distinctions. 
The ovals represent the memorial evidence for new words of low and high frequency and 
old words of low and high frequency from each source. The horizontal line represents 
source criterion. The vertical lines represent response criteria for old/new and 
recollect/familiar decisions. 
Dual process theories hypothesize memory as two separate and independent 
systems that account for memories associated with contextual or episodic details (i.e., 
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strength (i.e., familiarity). For dual process models, familiarity is thought to be a 
continuous process that occurs automatically and is thought to reflect implicit memory, 
semantic memory, or generic familiarity, while recollection is thought to be a controlled 
process that occurs if an item or event gives rise to the recollection of episodic details, 
and is thought to reflect explicit memory or episodic memory (Mandler, 1980; Jacoby, 
1991; Yonelinas, 2002). Familiarity should contain no associated episodic details, while 
recollection should reflect conscious awareness of an item or events’ experience from 
encoding. Some models of dual process theory classify items in terms of their potential to 
be consciously recollected such as heightened activation for that item that would lead to 
recollection or some other experience that is entirely differentiated from familiarity 
(Reder et al., 2000). Some models account for remembering as being due to an 
assessment of familiarity of an item, or due to a controlled search process that would lead 
to recollection (Mandler, 1980). Some have also accounted for familiarity being due to 
processing fluency that occurs in an automatic fashion, while recollection is due to a 
consciously controlled search process where contextual and episodic details are retrieved 
from memory (Jacoby, 1991). It is also thought that familiarity is due to the quantitative 
memorial aspects of an item, whereas recollection results from the all-or-none likelihood 
for episodic or contextual details to be present at retrieval (Yonelinas, 1999; 2002). Some 
models have proposed a signal detection interpretation for the familiarity process, where 
the distributions for old and new items may overlap, while recollection functions 
independently (Yonelinas, 1999; 2002).  
Dual process models account for the word frequency effect in terms of prior, or 
preexperimental, contexts associated with low and high frequency words and their 
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respective activation maintained in memory (Joordens & Hockley, 2000; Reder et al., 
2000; Diana & Reder, 2006). High frequency words are assumed to be associated with 
more prior contexts than low frequency words, thus accounting for higher rates of 
familiar responses, lower rates of recollect responses, and higher rates of false alarms. 
Low frequency words, being associated with fewer prior contexts, are better associated 
with the experimental context (or source), generating an overall accuracy advantage in 
recognition, in source memory, and the higher rates of recollect responses and lower rates 
of familiar responses that are given to those items.  
Evidence from neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience suggests that 
different brain regions can account for recognition that is accompanied by recollection 
and familiarity. Investigations from special populations that suffer amnesia due to some 
kind of brain injury show that both recollection and familiarity can be impaired, however 
recollection consistently appears to show greater deficits than familiarity (Knowlton & 
Squire, 1995; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998; Rajaram, Hamilton, 
& Bolton, 2002). This same pattern has been shown in patients with damage to the 
hippocampus due to childhood hypoxia, and the deficits in recollection and familiarity 
are affected by the extent of damage to that region (Yonelinas, Kroll, Quamme, Lazzara, 
Sauvé, Widaman, & Knight, 2002). Evidence from neuroimaging studies also show the 
hippocampus contributes to both recollection and familiarity; however, the hippocampus 
may be a more important contributor to recollection while areas of the medial temporal 
lobe surrounding the hippocampus appear to be a more important contributor to 
familiarity (Knowlton, 1998; Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski, Bookheimer, & Engel, 
2000). Findings from studies using event-related potentials (ERPs) have shown that the 
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frontal and parietal regions of the brain also contribute to recollection and familiarity 
(Rugg, Mark, Walla, Schloerscheidt, Birch, & Allan, 1998). The frontal areas have been 
shown to become quickly activated in the presence of recollection and familiarity, as well 
as in accurate source memory (Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, & Greene, 2004) and with 
recognition of low frequency words (Rugg, Cox, Doyle, & Wells, 1995). Activation has 
been shown to spread, however not as quickly, to the left lateral parietal region when 
recognition is thought to be accompanied exclusively with feelings of recollection 
(Curran, 2000). Interestingly, no studies have shown decrements in familiarity with 
recollection fully intact (Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003).  
Regardless of the models utilized to test any hypothesis concerning recollection 
and familiarity, it is apparent in the data that this measure of subjective awareness may 
not necessarily reflect one memory system or the other, but is nevertheless useful in 
showing what is being retrieved from study when remembering is associated with 
normative word frequency and the requirement for source attributions. Just as old/new 
decisions are not process pure, it would appear that recollect/familiar decisions act much 
in the same way (Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Gonsalves, Kahn, Curran, Norman, & Wagner, 
2005; Wixted, 2007). It may be the recollect responses reflect items recognized with high 
confidence while familiar responses reflect items recognized with relatively lower 
confidence in typical laboratory tasks. From the current data, as well as the findings from 
past investigations, it appears that recognition may occur due to contributions of both 
recollection and familiarity. 
Though not subscribing to one theory or the other, the data suggest that when 
participants are asked for the RF distinction first, they tend be more inclined to give a 
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recollect response to old items, while participants who were asked for the source decision 
first tended to exhibit more accurate recognition in terms of source identification for both 
items called recollect and for items called familiar. The data suggest that having the RF 
decision come first may cause participants to respond more liberally, as shown in the 
patterns of recollect responses and in the hits and false alarms in Table 2. Whereas 
having the source decision come first may cause participants to be more conservative in 
their responding, as evident in the increased source accuracy for that group in the data in 
Table 3. Although post hoc, this sort of criterion shift is more consistent with signal 
detection models of the recollect/familiar distinction that explicitly posit a decision 
criterion to separate recollection from familiarity (e.g., Donaldson, 1996; Hicks & Marsh, 
1999). There is no a priori reason to expect differences between these test conditions 
owing to overall memory strength or to distribution placement as depicted in Figures 1 
and 2.   . 
Obviously, the findings from the current study need to be validated with other 
manipulations that may affect what exactly is retrieved at the time of test, as well as other 
methods that may be better explained by a single or dual process model of memory. 
Certainly other manipulations of testing should be conducted to further delineate the 
cognitive processes at retrieval that may be affected by such manipulations. How might 
responding be affected if two separate tests at retrieval are administered and participants 
are asked for either recollect or familiar judgments first, and then given the same list of 
items judged old to be assigned to the correct source, and vice versa? How might 
responding change if participants are probed for a rationale for a given recollect decision 
to see what basis they are using to report items have associated episodic details? 
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Confidence ratings also be used with the current type of test manipulation to examine 
both source memory and what would be recollection or familiarity, and from these, 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves can be generated and explained in terms 
of single and dual process models of memory. The current investigation is a first step 
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